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INTRODUCTION
The European Union was not designed to be a human
rights organisation and yet, with the emergence of an EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter referred to as
the Charter), that has already acquired some legal effect
despite not being binding, the EU has now committed
itself unqualifiedly to being a staunch defender of human
rights. One preliminary question is whether this
development is desirable. Why should the EU protect
human rights? Why not leave that to the Member States? A
fortiori, why not be content to let a specialist body like the
Council of Europe protect human rights under its
specifically-designed European Convention on Human
Rights? Such issues are policy matters and what is
lamentable is that in relation to human rights the EU has
never had a constructive, overarching human rights policy.
As a result of this, the regulation of human rights has been
an incremental, usually ad hoc process in the EU until very
recent times. What in fact occurred historically is that
human rights elements started appearing in the case law of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and something
practical had to be done about the situation. This
incremental judicial development was not conducive to the
creation of an overall EU policy on human rights and partly
explains why few questioned the regulation of human
rights in the EU as a matter of principle. However, there
are arguments for and against the EU’s belated involvement
in human rights.
First, it is important for the ECJ to consider individuals’
more general concerns as well as purely economic matters
when the court is confronted by such issues in a given case.
Moreover, the EU is a significant political actor in the
world and there is an expectation that it will concern itself
with human rights. Dealing with human rights also gives
the EU a certain ethical foundation, and a tier of human
rights adjudication within the ECJ would emphasise the
EU’s concern for the observance of human rights norms.
The EU must also keep up with the development of human
rights in its Member States and is in a position to unify and
harmonise their separate human rights policies. The EU
can monitor the Member States’ human rights records, and
such EU vigilance can act as a catalyst for the remedying of
any national lack of initiative or success in this realm. 
In addition, it is arguable that the EU is in a more
objective position to regulate human rights than is
sometimes found in individual national states with their
varying subjective policies. This EU position is also a
usefully superior position, and the EU can act as an
instructive and dominant guide for the Member States in
the human rights field. A technical reason for the EU’s
necessary involvement in human rights is the presence of
criminal justice monitoring under the Third Pillar which
requires the EU to follow a certain human rights course. The
enlargement of the EU has required the EU to survey
human rights policies and actions in the new Member
States. If necessary, a state can be refused admission to the
Union on account of its poor human rights performance,
and the EU can punish Member States for any national
human rights violations by, inter alia, ceasing to trade with
them. Some commentators opine that having the EU in
charge of human rights is undemocratic because in the
Member States the type of voting is preferable in being
more democratic, but others contend that such an appeal
for subsidiarity is misjudged because the EU can protect
minorities better than under a national majority-dictating
voting mechanism, and human rights tend to involve
minorities.
HISTORY AND IMPROVEMENT
In view of the above considerations, we might wonder
why human rights protection was not a goal of the EU from
its very start. As is well known, the EU began as a totally
economically-oriented body of six states concerned with
primarily coal and steel, and the enhancement of their
trade in these areas. It was only very gradually that the EU
moved towards political initiatives as well as economic
ones, having made changes from the EEC to the EC to the
EU. At its inception, therefore, the organisation did not
have reason to believe that it would need to involve itself
with human rights issues. Moreover, the Council of Europe
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in Strasbourg was specifically developed to regulate human
rights in the contracting states of the European Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the
Convention) so it was not self-evident that the EU would
begin replicating this remit itself (all the EU states are now
party to the Convention). The debate continues as to
whether we really need two parallel human rights
jurisdictions in Europe. Another reason why human rights
did not feature as an EU concern at its beginning is that the
founding states were disorientated after World War II and
did not wish to give up significant power to an
international body such as the EU. Human rights,
moreover, are now a highly topical concern, but that was
not the case in 1945, when the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights had not even been born.
Nevertheless, there began to appear foundations for the
development of an EU human rights involvement. The EU
became concerned about discrimination, with the
establishment, for example, of “equal pay for equal work”,
so its anti-discrimination initiatives were, in principle,
close subject-wise to the notion of human rights. The EU,
moreover, was relatively quick to develop a human rights
aspect to its external policy, and this had a knock-on effect
for its internal policy. The EU institutions, such as the
European Parliament, developed human rights roles;
together with the European Council, the Parliament still
monitors contemporary human rights issues. One
drawback for the founding of an EU human rights
approach was the lack of an holistic policy on human
rights, and the lack of a doctrine of precedent in the ECJ
led to contradictory decisions on human rights. On a
practical level, the ECJ’s  judges were ill-equipped to
adjudicate human rights cases, not least from a lack of
expertise in this field. The Commission was also too
bureaucratic and ponderous to monitor human rights
matters quickly and efficiently. The EU also took its time in
regulating its own institutions human rights-wise.
So, the lack of an overall human rights policy accepted,
what could the EU do in other respects to enhance its
human rights profile? A body to hone and better co-
ordinate the beginnings of such a human rights policy
would improve the situation. Some also suggest accession
to the Convention but this is still a controversial matter to
do with EU competence or power. The judges of the ECJ
could be trained to deal with human rights law more
efficiently. The ECJ could also benefit from a specific
document to guide it, together with an initiative to process
human rights as a higher plateau of judicial concern.
Doctrines could be built up in the court more meticulously
by instituting a doctrine of binding precedent, thus
avoiding contradictory human rights judgments and obiter
pronouncements. Member States could become more co-
operative and more answerable to the EU for their human
rights infringements; they could also increase EU funds for
human rights developments. Greater support could be
given to the EU Charter, to either separate it from other
constitutional documentation that could founder, or to
make all or some of such documentation that includes it
binding. A step could be taken to open up for further
discussion the disjunction between the Convention
jurisdiction based exclusively on human rights and the EU
parameters of human rights protection. How the Charter
affects such a problematic should also be clearly and
cogently ascertained. At the moment, the suspension of the
EU’s constitutional plans radically inhibits the evolution of
a human rights plan or timetable for human rights
development by the EU.
THE CHARTER
The Charter is now incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty
following the demise of the original draft constitutional
treaty so the EU appears to be continuing to galvanise and
extend its human rights interests. Contrary to popular
belief, the concept of such a charter in EU law is not new.
In the 1950s, a charter to replicate the Convention was
envisaged but no treaty development occurred because of
the EU’s preoccupation with its economic targets. It was
only after the case of Stauder, Case 29/69 Stauder v City of
Ulm [1969] ECR 419, that human rights formally became
recognised as part of EU law. In that case, it was judicially
stated that fundamental human rights were enshrined in
the general principles of EC/EU law. The implication was
that this was where human rights had always been lodged
as a legal category. Subsequently, a human rights doctrine
of sorts was constructed by the ECJ following a series of
relevant cases but this was a hazy theme full of
contradictions and complexities reflective of the ECJ’s lack
of knowledge when dealing with human rights law. It is
arguable that this relative ineptitude was another spur for
the development of a clear and coherent statement of the
rights protected by EU law in the form of a charter. 
There are various theories as to why the Stauder
development took place: one idea is that the notion of
human rights was forged in the ECJ’s  case law as part of a
remit to counteract Germany’s questioning of the
supremacy of EC/EU law. It has also even been suggested
that human rights were artificially designed into the EU
legal order as an attempt to weaken democracy, which is
rather far-fetched. A creditable observation, though, is
that, even when the EU was habituating itself to its political
ambitions, it nevertheless retained a bias towards the
protection of “market rights”, indicating perhaps that the
espousal of human rights ideals was simply camouflage
beneath which to further strengthen its commercial goals,
with which it is more centrally associated. This argument is
undermined, though, by the presence of the Charter now
in the second part of the extant but unratified
constitutional Lisbon treaty, as the commitment to such a
charter indicates human rights priorities in general as an
EU concern. One interpretation of the presence of this
Charter in a constitutionally-relevant document is that a
covert EU intention is extremely political, and futuristic4
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i.e. that the Charter become a bill of rights in a new federal
state of Europe founded on the EU. This notion is one
mainly adhered to by radical Eurosceptics but it is certainly
true that the EU has developed in leaps and bounds
regarding its political, as opposed to merely economic,
ambitions, and further EU political cohesion is virtually
inevitable.
THE CHARTER AND THE CONVENTION
If the Charter becomes binding following the proposed
but unlikely ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it will
establish a human rights legal order that will parallel that of
the Convention. This raises a number of interesting
questions. First, since a common opinion is that the
Convention has been an extremely successful regional
international human rights instrument, can the Charter
really compete with it or will it be practically redundant?
How will decisions be made by solicitors advising their
clients about both human rights routes to justice? If the
client’s problem is economic, will he/she be advised to take
the Charter route? Moreover, if similar litigation results in
involvement with both the European Court of Justice and
the European Court of Human Rights, which
decision/precedent should prevail? It is commonly
assumed that the EU court will always defer to the
authority of the Strasbourg court but can this be
guaranteed, and what could be the consequences if not? A
confusion and contradiction of rights priorities and values
across Europe? It is true that the Strasbourg court is a
victim of its own success in that it is vastly over-burdened
by cases, so the presence of another European human
rights court might alleviate such a burden, but what if that
other court is lamentably substantially less specialised, and
therefore ineluctably less adept at human rights regulation?
What if that other court itself is over-burdened as the EU
court indubitably is? Would European citizens experience
great delays and, more importantly, great variance in the
quality of legal process afforded them? The EU court has
often been criticised for exaggerating its jurisdiction and
imposing uniform rules on Member States: should this be
extended further to the realm of human rights? What will
become of subsidiarity in the EU and the margin of
appreciation in the Convention system? Will the presence
of two substantial human rights courts in Europe render
local decision-making more subsidiary, and negotiated
more dismissively and expediently, in the legal knowledge
that, given the increase in appeals, the important decision-
making will ultimately lie in one or other international
court? The EU court is, moreover, composed of a judiciary
that is unelected and unaccountable. That state of affairs
rests uncomfortably with the Strasbourg position which
ensures that each judicial candidate is evaluated thoroughly.
There are also more questions to be asked of the EU if
it embarks on adopting a more cardinal human rights
profile. Unlike most other human rights regimes, it will
retain at least an aspect of its economic focus, even though
some commentators think its economic activity is virtually
exhausted, a view with which this author disagrees. The EU
will still be a hybrid body because of its economic origins
and, for a human rights institution, this is unusual, and
could be debilitating as far as resources are concerned.
Moreover, under the Strasbourg system, a right-holder is
seen as an individual per se, and this idea is clearly divorced
from the notion of citizenship. The EU model is very
different. Freedom of movement, and other EU-based
freedoms, are firmly attached to the idea of EU citizenship,
and Member States breach citizens’ rights, which are
binding on those states, only when implementing or acting
upon EU law. This point emphasises again the unforeseen
human rights position of the EU, which fits uneasily with
more traditional human rights approaches in more mono-
dimensional institutions such as the Council of Europe.
The EU human rights mandate, moreover, cannot expand
the substantive content of human rights in the EU  because
the EU has limited competence to enact rules on human
rights and were there not such a limitation leading Member
States might refuse to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. 
Member States of the EU have a tendency to enjoy all
the economic benefits the EU provides but to resist, or
even resent, significant political consequences of their EU
membership, whether or not they are connected with
economic advantages. This prevailing attitude is probably
why the Charter originally, at the draft stage in Nice in
2000, did not include the rights of minorities, which is a
substantial and surprising omission for a comprehensive
human rights instrument.  
Finally, in the Charter there is an accession clause
facilitating accession to the Convention. Should such
accession take place, the institutions of the EU would be
subject to review by the Strasbourg court and, as a direct
consequence, the EU would be unable to be the final
arbiter on the legality of EU law. This would make the
enforcement of the Charter’s provisions subject to the
approval of the Strasbourg court. A hierarchy would then
be established that would involve much repetition of rights
enforcement. Apart from Strasbourg adjudication on a few
innovative provisions in the Charter, the review of Charter
rights by the Strasbourg court would be a mundane,
repetitive, and resource-wasting operation. A realist or
cynic might say that such lamentable circumstances would
not have arisen had the EU not embarked on an
impromptu dealing with human rights in the first place. 
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